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Abstract
We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An
optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We ﬁrst
study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that
eﬃciency is possible only if the individuals who decide on public good provision
face an own incentive scheme that diﬀers from the tax system. We then study
democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods.
Under such a mechanism, eﬃciency cannot be reached and welfare from public good
provision declines as the inequality between rich and poor individuals increases.
Keywords: Public goods, optimal taxation, two-dimensional heterogeneity, asym-
metric information
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This paper studies the interdependence of optimal tax policies and optimal expenditure
policies, with a focus on information and incentive problems. An interdependence arises
under the assumption that tax revenues are used to pay for a public good. An individ-
ual’s assessment of a public good will then depend on both the individual’s valuation
of the public good and on his earning abilities which determine his income. Hence,
the tax policy aﬀects an individual’s willingness to communicate his public goods pref-
erences truthfully to “the system.” This raises the question what an optimal tax and
expenditure policy looks like that takes this interdependence into account.
We address this question from two diﬀerent angles. First, we study optimal tax and
expenditure policies from a mechanism design perspective. In this approach, the only
constraints that an allocation has to satisfy are physical feasibility and incentive com-
patibility, i.e., it has to be taken into account that individuals are privately informed
about their abilities and their preferences. Second, we study a class of allocation mech-
anisms that we call democratic mechanisms. These mechanisms take, in addition, two
institutional constraints into account: (i) individuals vote over public goods and (ii) all
individuals pay taxes.
Under a general allocation mechanism individuals communicate their utility functions.
Decisions on public good provision can thus reﬂect the preference intensities of indi-
viduals. By contrast, under a voting procedure individuals can only express whether
they want a public good to be provided. If so, they vote yes and otherwise they vote
no. Hence, under a voting scheme, each person has the same inﬂuence on public good
provision, irrespective of the person’s utility function.
A general allocation mechanism makes it possible to separate the individuals who pay
taxes from the individuals who decide on public good provision. For instance, it is
possible to draw a random sample of individuals who are exempt from the general
tax system and whose public goods preferences are elicited via some Clarke-Groves
mechanism. The decision on public good provision would then be a function of the
characteristics of those individuals who are in the sample. A democratic mechanism
excludes this possibility. It is based on the normative premise that the relevant prefer-
ences for a decision on public good provision are the preferences of those who pay for
the public good via the tax system. We refer to this principle as “no taxation without
representation.”
The assumptions that individuals express their preferences via voting and that all in-
dividuals are taxpayers are made in many papers on the political economy of taxation
and public good provision. They are empirically motivated. In a democratic society,
citizens express political support by means of voting decisions. Moreover, a consti-
tutional principle in a democracy is that citizens with the same characteristics are
treated equally. Suppose there are two households who have the same characteristics.
In a democracy, it would not be acceptable that one of them decides on public good
provision whereas the other household works in order to generate the tax revenues that
1are needed to pay for the public good. Rather, both households should have the same
inﬂuence on public good provision and the same duty to contribute to its ﬁnancing.
We introduce these assumptions into an analysis of optimal tax and expenditure poli-
cies. The key diﬀerence to a positive political economy analysis is that neither the tax
system nor the rule according to which votes are translated into expenditures are deter-
mined as the equilibrium of a political game. Instead, the tax system and the provision
rule for the public good are chosen in order to maximize welfare. Our analysis thus
determines the optimal allocation that satisﬁes a speciﬁc political economy constraint,
namely, that the preferences of taxpayers are decisive for public good provision and
that these preferences are articulated via a voting system.
We consider a model with a continuum of individuals who diﬀer in their abilities and
either have a high or a low preference for the public good. The public good is ﬁnanced
via an optimal nonlinear income tax. An information problem arises because there is
uncertainty about the population share of individuals with a high taste parameter. For
this environment, we establish the following results:
First, optimal mechanism design makes it possible to achieve an eﬃcient provision of
public goods; i.e., the incentive constraints due to private information on public goods
preferences do not aﬀect the optimal allocation. To establish this result, we consider
a ﬁnite random sample of individuals. These individuals face an own incentive scheme
that is diﬀerent from the optimal income tax and ensures that truth-telling of indi-
viduals in the sample is a dominant strategy. If we let the sample size go to inﬁnity,
the sample provides very accurate information about the distribution of public goods
preferences and the decision on public good provision is approximately eﬃcient.
Second, with a democratic mechanism an eﬃcient provision of public goods can not be
approximated. This result is based on the observation that, under an optimal income
tax system, an individual’s valuation of the public good is an increasing function of
the skill level. Highly productive individuals have, ceteris paribus, a larger valuation
because they do not suﬀer as much if taxes are raised to pay for the public good.
This dependence of individuals valuations on abilities is the driving force behind the
failure of eﬃciency: If many individuals in the economy have a low preference for the
public good, this implies that every high-skilled individual – even those with a low
taste parameter – has an above average valuation of the public good. Consequently,
all high-skilled individuals vote in favor of more public spending. From a welfare per-
spective, this generates an excessive demand for public goods because a comparison of
social costs and beneﬁts would take the high tax burden of low skilled individuals into
account. Analogously, if many individuals have a high valuation of the public good,
then all low-skilled individual have a below-average valuation and will thus vote for less
public spending. The demand for public goods is then too low because the lower tax
burden of high skilled individuals is not given appropriate weight. The consequence of
these considerations is that the provision rule for the public good has to be distorted
in order to eliminate both the excessive demand for public goods of high-skilled indi-
2viduals and the deﬁcient demand of low skilled individuals.
Finally, we show that the discrepancy between an eﬃcient provision rule and the opti-
mal democratic mechanism is an increasing function of the extent of skill heterogeneity:
the distortions of the optimal democratic mechanism become larger as the diﬀerence
between a high-skilled individual and a low-skilled individual increases. This is our
main insight: Under a democratic mechanism, inequality is bad not only for distribu-
tive reasons, but also because it is harmful for public good provision.
Our paper also makes a technical contribution. The attempt to link the theory of
optimal taxation with the theory of public goods faces a conceptual problem. The
theory of optimal income taxation, in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971), analyzes “large”
economies in which every individual takes the tax system and expenditures as given.
The theory of public goods, in the tradition of Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973), by
contrast, is based on a “small” economy in which every individual can aﬀect how much
of a public good is provided. To deal with this issue, we adopt an idea that has been
developed by Green and Laﬀont (1979). We consider a continuum of agents but as-
sume that a ﬁnite random sample of individuals is drawn for the purpose of preference
elicitation. Under a general mechanism, these individuals interact according to some
revelation game, whereas under a democratic mechanism, we consider a random sample
of tax payers who vote over the public good. To single out the “reasonable” equilib-
rium in an economy with a continuum of individuals, we study the properties of these
mechanisms as the sample size goes to inﬁnity.1
Our paper is related to various strands of the literature.
It contributes to a recent literature that uses mechanism design methods to character-
ize optimal tax policies. See, for instance, Golosov et al. (2003), Kocherlakota (2005)
or Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007). A paper that is related to our work is Acemoglu
et al. (2007) who also introduce a political economy constraints into a model of optimal
taxation. In particular, they relax the assumption of a benevolent mechanism designer
and assume that citizens can use a voting mechanism to control politicians.
Bassetto and Phelan (2008) develop a model that is similar to ours, event though their
paper diﬀers in focus. These authors study optimal allocations in an economy without
production where individuals can either have a high or a low endowment. There is
aggregate uncertainty because the population share of individuals with a high endow-
ment is a random variable. The authors focus on the characterization of an optimal
insurance scheme that is robust in the sense that it does not require strong assumptions
on individual beliefs nor suﬀers from multiple equilibria. Our model diﬀers in that we
have endogenous production and aggregate uncertainty regarding the population share
of individuals with a high valuation of a public good. A similarity is that we also
1We thereby also provide a foundation for the use of tie-breaking rules in models with a continuum
of voters, where, literally speaking, every action proﬁle is an equilibrium. Examples for the use of
tie-breaking rules can be found in Meirowitz (2005) or Gersbach (2005).
3model aggregate uncertainty as randomness in the share of individuals with a certain
characteristic.2 Moreover, we also address the problem of robustness. While we use a
a sampling approach for the purpose of equilibrium selection, we also focus on imple-
mentation in dominant strategies to avoid assumptions about individual beliefs.3
Our model of taxation is a simple version of an optimal nonlinear income tax system
that is due to Weymark (1987, 1986). Our work is also related to a literature that
analyzes public goods under the assumption that a distortionary tax system is used
to cover the costs; see, for example, Atkinson and Stern (1974), Boadway and Keen
(1993), or Gahvari (2006). This literature, however, is based on a complete information
environment in which the distribution of public goods preferences is common knowl-
edge. Hence, there is no problem of preference elicitation.
This latter problem is analyzed in the literature on public good provision under asym-
metric information. Recent contributions to this literature include Hellwig (2003),
Norman (2004), or Neeman (2004). In these models, individuals diﬀer only in their
tastes for a public good. Neither skill heterogeneity nor a redistributive tax system
are involved in the analysis. Moreover, the focus lies on the distortions that arise if
participation constraints have to be satisﬁed. In our paper, individuals do not have
veto rights and the state’s power to raise taxes in order to ﬁnance public goods is taken
as given.
The idea that a voting rule can be viewed as a mechanism that aggregates informa-
tion that is dispersed among many individuals goes back to Condorcet (1785); see also
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) or Piketty (1999).
To the best of our knowledge we are the ﬁrst authors who solve for an optimal voting
mechanism that aggregates dispersed information.
The remainder is organized as follows. In Section 2 we specify the model. In Sec-
tion 3 we consider the problem of public good provision from an optimal mechanism




The economy consists of a continuum of individuals, I := [0,1]. The preferences of
individual i are given by the utility function
θiQ + u(C) −
Y
wi ,
2A much earlier paper that models aggregate uncertainty in this way is Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
3This reasoning can be formalized following the approach of Bergemann and Morris (2005). In our
framework, robustness of an equilibrium allocation in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005) is
equivalent to implementability in dominant strategies.
4where Q denotes the quantity of a non-excludable public good, C is the consumption
of private goods or after-tax income, and Y is the individual’s contribution to the
economy’s output or pre-tax income. u is a strictly increasing and strictly concave
function. An individual’s valuation of the public good depends on a taste parameter
θi that may take two diﬀerent values, θi ∈ Θ := {θL,θH} with 0 ≤ θL < θH.4 The
disutility of productive eﬀort depends on the skill parameter wi, wi ∈ W := {wL,wH}
with 0 ≤ wL < wH.5
The parameters wi and θi are both private information of individual i and taken to
be the realizations of the stochastically independent random variables ˜ wi and ˜ θi, re-
spectively. The random variables ( ˜ wi)i∈I are independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.). The probability that an individual has a high skill level is denoted as
η := Prob{wi = wH} .
The random variables (˜ θi)i∈I are also i.i.d.. p denotes the probability that any one
individual has a high taste parameter,
p := Prob{θi = θH} .
In addition, we assume that a law of large numbers (LLN) applies;6 that is, almost
surely, after the realization of randomness at the individual level, the cross-section
distribution of characteristics in the economy coincides with the ex ante probability
distribution that governs the randomness at the individual level. Accordingly, the
probabilities η and p are interpreted as the fractions of individuals with a high earn-
ing ability and a high taste parameter, respectively. The LLN also implies that the
empirical skill distribution and the empirical taste distribution are independent in the
sense that the fraction of high-skilled individuals with a high taste parameter and the
fraction of low-skilled individuals with a high taste parameter are both equal to p.
We assume that η is common knowledge. Consequently, at the aggregate level, there is
no uncertainty about the skill distribution. By contrast, the share of individuals with
a high taste parameter p is taken to be a random quantity; i.e., there is uncertainty
about the distribution of preferences for the public good. The unknown parameter p is
henceforth also referred to as the state of the economy.
4The assumption that there are only two possible taste parameters is important for the tractability of
the model. However, neither the results in Section 3 nor the characterization of democratic mechanisms
in Proposition 3 depend on this assumption.
5The assumption that there are only two possible skill levels is made for ease of exposition. Our
main result in Proposition 4 can also be proven if W contains a ﬁnite number of possible skill levels or
if W is a compact interval.
6Postulating a LLN for a continuum of i.i.d. random variables creates a measurability problem, as
has been noted by Judd (1985) and Feldman and Gilles (1985). There is, however, a recent literature on
modeling approaches which circumvent this measurability problem; see Al` os-Ferrer (2002) or Al-Najjar
(2004).
5Optimal Income Taxation
We assume that the decisions on taxation and public good provision are made sequen-
tially. First, the decision on public good provision is taken. This generates a tax
revenue requirement of K(Q), where K is an increasing, continuously diﬀerentiable,
and convex cost function, satisfying K′(0) = 0 and limx→∞ K′(x) = ∞. Given this
revenue requirement, taxes are set in order to maximize utilitarian welfare. At this last
stage, we assume that the revenue requirement is treated as exogenous. In particular,
the tax-setting authorities can not commit to deviate from an ex post optimal tax pol-
icy in order to inﬂuence the initial decision on public good provision.7
The tax-setting authority solves the following optimization problem. Choose a tax
function T : Y  → T(Y ) in order to maximize utilitarian welfare
η
 




+ (1 − η)
 




subject to the constraints that individual behavior is utility maximizing given the tax
function T, for all t ∈ {L,H},




and the budget constraint,
ηT(YH) + (1 − η)T(YL) ≥ K(Q) .
The solution to this optimization is well known and we only sketch the derivation.8
Instead of choosing the function T, the tax setting authority can, without loss of gen-
erality, be assumed to choose pre- and after-tax income of individuals directly.9 Hence,



























and the feasibility constraint
η(YH − CH) + (1 − η)(YL − CL) ≥ K(Q) .
At a solution to this problem, the feasibility constraint is binding. Otherwise, the out-
put requirements of all individuals could be lowered without violating the self-selection
constraints. Moreover, the self-selection constraint u(CH)−YH/wH ≥ u(CL)−YL/wH
is binding and the self-selection constraint u(CL) − YL/wL ≥ u(CH) − YH/wL is slack.
This is a consequence of the assumption that u is a strictly concave function. A ﬁrst best
7In a companion paper, Bierbrauer and Sahm (2007), we relax this assumption and show that it is,
in general, beneﬁcial to distort the tax system if such a commitment is possible.
8A rigorous solution can be found in Hellwig (2007). The special case of preferences that are quasi-
linear in leisure is treated by Weymark (1986, 1987).
9This observation is known as the taxation principle. See, for instance, Guesnerie (1995).
6utilitarian allocation is such that marginal utilities of consumption are equal, implying
that CL = CH. Moreover, the economy’s output is produced only by the productive
individuals, YL = 0 and YH > 0. This outcome violates the self-selection constraint
for the productive individuals. They would rather choose the consumption level CL
without having to produce any output. Hence, redistribution is limited by a binding
self-selection constraint.
Using these observations we can solve for YL and YH as a function of CL, CH and Q,
YL = K(Q) + 1
2(CH + CL) − 1
2wH(u(CH) − u(CL)) ,
YH = K(Q) + 1
2(CH + CL) + 1
2wH(u(CH) − u(CL)) .
(1)
These expressions can be substituted into the objective function. Utilitarian welfare is


























The allocation for the productive individuals is undistorted in the sense that their
marginal utility of consumption is equal to the marginal disutility of eﬀort. By contrast,
the allocation of less productive individuals is distorted since their marginal utility of
consumption is strictly larger then their disutility of eﬀort. Hence, the optimal income
tax implies a downward distortion in the labor supply of low-skilled individuals.
The ﬁrst order conditions imply that the after-tax incomes of high- and low-skilled
individuals do not depend on public good provision. By contrast, an increase in the
revenue requirement K(Q) by ∆ implies that the pre-tax incomes also increase by ∆.
Taking these implications of optimal income taxation into account, individual utilities
can be represented in a reduced form.
Lemma 1 Optimal income taxation, given a level Q of the public good, implies that
the utility U(Q,θ,w) of an individual with characteristics θ ∈ Θ and w ∈ W equals
U(Q,θ,w) = θQ −
K(Q)
w + φ(w) ,
where


















and CL and CH are given by the ﬁrst order conditions in (2).
7The optimal decision on public good provision
Prior to income taxation, the decision on public good provision has to be taken. For a































pθH + (1 − p)θL
 
Q − λK(Q) .
The optimal level of public good provision, Q∗(p), is characterized by the ﬁrst order
condition
λK′(Q∗(p)) = pθH + (1 − p)θL .
This optimality condition is a modiﬁed version of the Samuelson Rule that takes into
account that a distortionary income tax system is used to cover the cost of public good
provision. The marginal social cost of public good provision, λK′(Q∗(p)), has to be
equal to the marginal social beneﬁt, pθH + (1 − p)θL.
The problem of information aggregation
The function Q∗ : p  → Q∗(p) speciﬁes the optimal quantity of the public good as
a function of p, i.e., as a function of the cross-section distribution of public goods
preferences. If a benevolent planner wants to provide public goods according to this
provision rule, she needs to acquire information on the actual value of p. However,
individuals have private information about their public goods preferences. This raises
the question whether information on p can indeed be obtained if individuals know that
the planner seeks to implement provision rule Q∗.
To motivate this problem, suppose that public goods are provided according to Q∗. An
individual’s utility can then be written as a function of p,
U∗(p,θ,w) := θQ∗(p) −
K(Q∗(p))
w .
With a slight abuse of notation, we drop the term φ(w) because it does not depend on












< 0 if θw < v(p) ,
= 0 if θw = v(p) ,
> 0 if θw > v(p) ,
where
v(p) :=
pθH + (1 − p)θL
λ = K′(Q∗(p))
8is a measure of the marginal social beneﬁt from public good provision that takes the
marginal cost of public funds, λ, into account. Analogously, θw is a measure of an
individual’s valuation of the public good that takes into account that public good
provision aﬀects the output requirements YL and YH.
An individual is better oﬀ if p is larger – or, equivalently, if more of the public good is
provided – if and only if her valuation, θw, exceeds the utilitarian valuation, v(p). An
individual with a below average valuation prefers to have a lower quantity of the public
good. Thus, individuals care about the planner’s perception of p. Generally, individuals
who pay taxes will not communicate their preferences truthfully if they can inﬂuence
the planner’s decision. Consider an individual with a low taste parameter and a high
skill level. Moreover, for the sake of the argument, assume that this individual believes
p to be very low.10 If a vast majority of individuals has a low taste parameter, then
this individual can be sure that his own valuation lies above the average, θLwH > v(p).
Put diﬀerently, the individual expects that the quantity of the public good is too low.
Hence, this individual is inclined to announce a high taste parameter.
We discuss two diﬀerent approaches to the problem of information aggregation. In
Section 3 we discuss the problem from a mechanism design perspective and show that
there is a mechanism that allows to achieve the modiﬁed Samuelson Rule. In Section
4 we study a “democratic” environment where tax payers vote over the level of public
good provision. In this setting, the modiﬁed Samuelson Rule can be no longer reached
and we characterize the optimal “democratic” provision rule.
3 Optimal Mechanism Design
In this section, we characterize provision rules that are achievable if individuals are
privately informed about their public goods preferences and their skills; that is, we focus
on incentive compatibility constraints. The main result is that there is a mechanism
that makes it possible to provide public goods according to the modiﬁed Samuelson
Rule, Q∗. However, this requires that the individuals who provide the information on
the distribution of preferences are separated from the set of individuals who cover the
cost of public good provision via their income tax payments.
Equilibrium Selection via Sampling
Mechanism design in a continuum economy leads to a severe problem of equilibrium
multiplicity. Suppose that public good provision is based on a direct mechanism, i.e.,
individuals announce their taste parameters and their skills to a mechanism designer.
Further, assume that the mechanism designer’s decision on public good provision is a
function of the measure of individuals who announce a high taste parameter. With such
a mechanism, any individual is willing to reveal the own taste parameter because, in a
10When this individual decides ex interim what taste parameter to announce, her prior beliefs put a
lot of probability mass on values of p that are close to zero.
9continuum economy, a single individual’s announcement does not aﬀect the measure of
individuals who announce a high taste parameter. This leads to the trivial conclusion
that Q∗ is an implementable provision rule because no individual has an impact on
public good provision and hence no individual minds revealing her characteristics to
the mechanism designer.
However, by the same reasoning, any behavior could be rationalized. For instance,
individuals with a low taste parameter and high skills might announce a high taste pa-
rameter, because they expect that the mechanism designer will choose a provision level
that is too low. More generally, whatever an individual announces, the announcement
is a best response because it is inconsequential in a continuum economy.
To deal with this problem of equilibrium multiplicity, we adopt an approach that has
been pioneered by Green and Laﬀont (1979). We study mechanisms that rely on sam-
pling; that is, a random sample of N individuals is asked to communicate their char-
acteristics to the mechanism designer. Based on the messages of sample members, the
mechanism designer decides on public good provision. Finally, individuals who have
not been in the sample choose their labor supply taking the income tax into account.
We study the properties of these sample mechanisms as N → ∞ and an individual’s
impact on public good provision vanishes.11
We invoke the Revelation Principle and limit attention to incentive-compatible, direct
mechanisms. Denote the set of sampled individuals by SN = {1,...,N}. A direct mech-
anism consists of a collection of functions ti
N : (Θ×W)N → R+, Ci
N : (Θ×W)N → R+,
i ∈ SN, and QN : (Θ×W)N → R+. ti
N((ˆ θi, ˆ wi)i∈SN) is an output requirement for sam-
ple member i if the proﬁle of announcements to the mechanism is given by (ˆ θi, ˆ wi)i∈SN.
Likewise, Ci
N((ˆ θi, ˆ wi)i∈SN) is individual i’s consumption as a function of the sample
member’s announcements. These output requirements and consumption levels are spe-
ciﬁc to the set of sampled individuals. Finally, QN((ˆ θi, ˆ wi)i∈SN) is the decision on
public good provision.
A direct mechanism is incentive-compatible, if truth-telling is a dominant strategy: for
all i ∈ SN, for all (ˆ θj, ˆ wj)j =i ∈ (Θ × W)N−1 and for all (θi,wi) ∈ Θ × W,
θiQN((ˆ θj, ˆ wj)j =i,(θi,wi)) + u(Ci




N((ˆ θj, ˆ wj)j =i,(θi,wi))
≥ θiQN((ˆ θj, ˆ wj)j =i,(ˆ θi, ˆ wi)) + u(Ci




N((ˆ θj, ˆ wj)j =i,(ˆ θi, ˆ wi)) ,
for all (ˆ θi, ˆ wi) ∈ Θ × W.
We focus on dominant strategies because this implies that the implementability of
11A notion of coalition-proofness could be used as an alternative criterion of equilibrium selection.
In Bierbrauer (2006, Chapter 3) it is shown that this leads to the same equilibrium selection as the
analysis in Section 4.
10an allocation is robust with respect to assumptions about the beliefs of individuals
concerning the random variable p and the characteristics of individuals in the sample.
The mechanism designer has the possibility to distinguish between individuals who are
in the sample and individuals who are not. The latter pay for the public good via the
income tax system. The tax revenues generated from the countable set of individuals
in the sample have no weight at an aggregate level. The output requirements {ti
N}i∈SN
and the consumption levels {Ci
N}i∈SN are used only to ensure incentive compatibility
for individuals in the sample.
Eﬃcient Provision Rules for Sample Mechanisms
The state of the economy p is a random quantity. For simplicity, we impose the following
assumption on the prior beliefs of the mechanism designer.12
Assumption 1 The mechanism designer takes p to be the realization of a random
variable which is uniformly distributed on [0,1].
QN is said to be an eﬃcient provision rule if QN((θi,wi)i∈SN) solves
maxQ E[(pθH + (1 − p)θL)Q − λK(Q) | (θi,wi)i∈SN] ,
for every (θi,wi)i∈SN.
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Let m := #{i ∈ SN | θi = θH}. QN is an











N + 2θH +
N − m + 1
N + 2 θL
 
Q − λK(Q) .
A mechanism designer has posterior beliefs on p that depend on the number m of
individuals in the sample with a high taste parameter. Given these posterior beliefs,















In particular, this valuation is an increasing function of the number m of individuals
with a high taste parameter.
Proposition 1 For N suﬃciently large, an eﬃcient provision rule is incentive-compatible
only if output requirements and consumption levels of individuals in the sample are dif-
ferent from those that these individuals would choose under the income tax system.
12Throughout we do not need to impose a common prior assumption. We only specify the prior
beliefs of the mechanism designer.
11A proof of Proposition 1 can be found in the Appendix. According to Proposition 1, if
the incentives of individuals are shaped only by the income tax, then an eﬃcient use of
the information that they provide is not possible. Eﬃciency can be achieved only via
an adjustment of output requirements and consumption levels.
Under an optimal income tax public goods preferences depend on taste parameters
and skills. This interaction of taste and skill parameters implies that an income tax
does not provide appropriate incentives for a revelation of public goods preferences. To
illustrate this, suppose that the possible valuations of the public good are ordered as
follows,
θLwL < θHwL < θLwH < θHwH .
Eﬃciency requires that if an individual announces a high taste parameter, then more of
the public good is provided. Incentive compatibility requires that this outcome makes
an individual with a high taste parameter better oﬀ. However, if θLwH > θHwL and an
announcement of θH is beneﬁcial for a low skilled individual with a high taste param-
eter, then it is also beneﬁcial for a high-skilled individual with a low taste parameter;
i.e., if incentive compatibility is ensured for all individuals with a high taste parameter,
this implies that incentive compatibility is violated for some individuals with a low
taste parameter.
The following mechanism is incentive-compatible and achieves an eﬃcient use of infor-
mation. Individuals in the sample have to produce a ﬁxed amount of output ¯ Y that
is independent of their announcements.13 The mechanism designer chooses consump-
tion levels {CL(m)}N−1
m=0 and {CH(m)}N
m=1 such that, if there are m individuals with a
high taste parameter in the sample, then every individual with a low taste parameter
consumes CL(m) and every individual with a high taste parameter consumes CH(m),
irrespective of the announced skill levels.
A truthful announcement of taste parameters is a dominant strategy if, for every
m ∈ {0,...,N − 1},
θLQ∗
N(m) + u(CL(m)) ≥ θLQ∗
N(m + 1) + u(CL(m + 1))
and
θLQ∗
N(m + 1) + u(CH(m + 1)) ≥ θHQ∗
N(m) + u(CL(m)) .
For instance, truth-telling is a (strict) best response for each individual in the sample
if, for every m, CL(m) and CH(m + 1) are chosen such that









Under an income tax, an individual’s contribution to a public good is a function of
13This output requirement does not aﬀect individual incentives. ¯ Y can, for instance, be set such
that, in expectation, the output of sample members is equal to their consumption. Alternatively, ¯ Y
could be set such that participation in the sample is voluntary. Since the sample has only countably
many individuals, ¯ Y does not aﬀect the economy’s resource constraint.
12the individual’s income. Proposition 1 shows that this implies that individuals whose
incentives are shaped by the tax system will not reveal their taste parameters. By
contrast, a mechanism where a subset of individuals is taken away from the labor market
and faces an alternative incentive scheme makes it possible to acquire information on
public goods preferences in an eﬃcient way. The following Proposition summarizes and
shows that the modiﬁed Samuelson Rule, Q∗, can indeed be approximated if the sample
size is chosen suﬃciently large. A proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 For every N, there exists an incentive compatible mechanism that
achieves an eﬃcient use of information. Let EW∗
N be the induced expected welfare
level. Then
limN→∞ EW∗




0 [(pθH + (1 − p)θL)Q∗(p) − λK(Q∗(p))]dp ,
is the expected welfare level induced by Q∗.
4 Democratic Mechanisms
In this section we study democratic mechanisms for income taxation and public good
provision. A democratic mechanism is deﬁned by two principles.
The ﬁrst principle is that individuals vote over public goods. Formally, individuals have
an action set with two elements yes and no. The decision on public good provision is
a function of the number of individuals who vote yes. If the public good comes as an
indivisible unit, Q ∈ {0,1}, then the public good is provided if the number of yes votes
exceeds some threshold. Our approach is more general in that we consider a public
good that can be provided in any quantity. The decision on public good provision is
then an increasing function of the number of individuals who vote yes; i.e. if more vot-
ers support public good provision then a larger quantity of the public good is provided.
Conceptually, the diﬀerence between a direct mechanism and a voting mechanism is
that the former asks individuals for their utility functions. A voting mechanism is ig-
norant about utility functions, each person – as opposed to each utility function – is
given equal consideration for the decision on public good provision.
The second principle is “no taxation without representation”. We study the impli-
cations of the postulate that a decision on public good provision should reﬂect the
preferences of those individuals who pay taxes. We thus assume that the individuals
who decide on public good provision face the same tax system as any other individual
in the economy. Formally, the utility function of a voter with characteristics (θ,w) is
given by
U(Q,θ,w) = θQ −
K(Q)
w ,
that is, by the utility function that is implied by an optimal income tax system.
134.1 Implementation by a voting mechanism
We consider a random sample of N individuals who decide on public good provision
via a voting procedure. We will let the sample size go to inﬁnity to single out the
“reasonable” equilibrium in the continuum economy. As in the previous section on
optimal mechanism design, a provision rule is a function QN : (Θ × W)N → R+ that
speciﬁes how much of the public good is provided as a function of the characteristics of
individuals in the sample. In the following we will ﬁrst formalize the notion that such
a provision rule is implementable by a voting mechanism. We will then give a complete
characterization of the provision rule with this property.
A voting mechanism is a game where individuals have an action set consisting of the
elements yes and no. The outcome of the voting game is a non-decreasing function
QV
N : {0,...,N} → R+ that speciﬁes a decision on public good provision as a function
of the number my of individuals who vote yes.
A strategy σ : Θ × W → {yes,no} for the game induced by the voting mechanism
speciﬁes an individual’s vote σ(θi,wi) as a function of the individual’s taste parameter
and skill level. σ is a dominant strategy if, σ(θ,w) = no implies that
U(QV
N(my),θ,w) ≥ U(QV
N(my + 1),θ,w) ,
for every my, and σ(θ,w) = yes implies that
U(QV
N(my),θ,w) ≥ U(QV
N(my − 1),θ,w) ,
for every my.
A provision rule QN : (Θ × W)N → R+ is said to be implementable by a voting
mechanism if there is a voting mechanism QV
N : {0,...,N} → R+ with an equilibrium





y((θi,wi)i∈SN) is the number of yes-votes induced by σ if the characteristics
of individuals in the sample are given by (θi,wi)i∈SN.
Proposition 3 Provision rule QN is implementable by a voting mechanism if and only
if there is a subset X of the set of types Θ×W such that the following properties hold:
i) Whenever (θ,w) belongs to X and (θ′,w′) does not belong to X then θw ≥ θ′w′.
ii) Whenever two samples SN and S′
N are such that #{i ∈ SN | (θi,wi) ∈ X} =
#{i ∈ S′
N | (θi,wi) ∈ X}, then QN((θi,wi)i∈SN) = QN((θi,wi)i∈S′
N). With
some abuse of notation we write QN(mX) instead of QN((θi,wi)i∈SN), where
mX := #{i ∈ SN | (θi,wi) ∈ X}.
iii) For all mX ∈ {0,...,N}, (θ,w) ∈ X implies that
U(QN(mX),θ,w) ≥ U(QN(mX − 1),θ,w) , (3)
14and (θ,w) ∈ −X implies that
U(QN(mX),θ,w) ≥ U(QN(mX + 1),θ,w) . (4)
Proposition 3 gives a complete characterization of the provision rules that can be de-
centralized via a voting mechanism. It is based on a binary partition of the set of types.
The set X contains the individuals who beneﬁt if more of a public good is provided
and hence vote yes. The complement −X contains the individuals who are harmed if
more of the public good is provided and vote no.
The proof is in the Appendix. It is based on the observation that any dominant strat-
egy equilibrium of a voting game partitions the set of types Θ × W into those who
vote yes, X, and those who vote no, −X. Consequently, a decision that reﬂects the
number of individuals who vote yes is equivalent to a decision that reﬂects the number
of individuals with types in X.
4.2 The main result
We use the following approach to characterize the optimal voting mechanism. For each
subset X of the set of types Θ×W that satisﬁes property i) in Proposition 3, we solve
for the provision rule QN : mX  → QN(mX) that maximizes
EWN,X :=
 N
mX=0 ρ(mX)E[(pθH + (1 − p)θL)Q − λK(Q) | mX] ,
where ρ(mX) is the probability that the number of sample members with characteristics
in X equals mX, subject to the equilibrium conditions in iii). We denote the optimal
provision rule by Q∗∗
N,X and the corresponding level of welfare by EW∗∗
N,X. We then let
N → ∞ and compute limN→∞ EW∗∗
N,X. Finally we compare the optima that correspond
to diﬀerent values of X to determine the optimal partition, X∗, and thereby the optimal
voting mechanism.
Proposition 4
i) The optimal democratic mechanism cannot approximate an eﬃcient decision on
public good provision. Formally, limN→∞ EW∗∗
N,X∗ < EW∗.
ii) The discrepancy between the optimal democratic mechanism and an eﬃcient
mechanism vanishes as the heterogeneity in abilities vanishes: limN→∞ EW∗∗
N,X∗
converges to EW∗ as wH converges to wL.
Theorem 4 follows from Lemmas 3–5 that are discussed in section 4.3. The main
statement is that, under a democratic mechanism, heterogeneity in skills is harmful for
public good provision.
To give an intuition, suppose that all individuals have the same skill level. This implies
that all individuals with a high taste parameter have an above average valuation of
15the public good and all individuals with a low taste parameter have a below average
valuation of the public good. If public goods are provided according to the Samuelson
Rule, then individuals with a high taste parameter vote yes to maximize the level of
public good provision. Likewise, individuals with a low taste parameter vote no. As a
consequence, the population share of individuals who vote yes is equal to the population
share of individuals with a high taste parameter p. Hence, a voting mechanism can
achieve public good provision according to the Samuelson Rule.
This reasoning breaks down if there is skill heterogeneity. If an individual with skill
level wL and taste parameter θH votes yes, then an individual with skill level wH
and taste parameter θL will also vote yes since the valuation of the public good by
the latter, wHθL, is close to or even exceeds wLθH. As a consequence, the provision
rule for the public good has to be distorted to ensure that the distribution of votes is
informative about the state of the economy. These distortions do not disappear as N
goes to inﬁnity.
4.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Without loss of generality, we limit attention to voting mechanisms where the set X of






To see that these are the only cases of interest, suppose ﬁrst that θLwH ≤ θHwL. In
this case the only alternatives are voting mechanisms where all individuals vote no
or all individuals vote yes. Clearly, such a voting mechanism does not generate any
information about the distribution of public goods preferences.
Now assume that θLwH > θHwL. In this case, a voting mechanism where individu-
als with types in {(θH,wL),(θH,wH)} vote yes is not admissible because it violates
property ii) of Proposition 3. A voting mechanism where all individuals with types
in {(θL,wH),(θH,wH)} vote yes would be admissible. However, such a voting mecha-
nism generates information about the number of high-skilled individuals in the sample.
Given the assumption that, for every p, skill levels and taste parameters of individuals
are independent random variables, this does not generate any information about public
goods preferences.
Deﬁnition 1 For any given X ∈ X denote by Q∗∗





[(pθH + (1 − p)θL)Q(p) − λK(Q(p))]dp ,
where Q : [0,1] → R+ has to be chosen such that, for every pair p and p′ with p′ > p,
(θ,w) ∈ X implies that
U(Q(p′),θ,w) ≥ U(Q(p),θ,w) , (5)
16and (θ,w) ∈ −X implies that
U(Q(p),θ,w) ≥ U(Q(p′),θ,w) . (6)
Lemma 3 For any given X ∈ X, limN→∞ EW∗∗
N,X = EW∗∗
X .
A formal proof of Lemma 3 can be found in the Appendix. According to the Lemma,
as the sample size goes to inﬁnity, the mechanism designer chooses a provision rule
Q  → Q(p) that speciﬁes a decision on public good provision for each state p of the
economy. To ensure that this provision rule can be decentralized by a voting mechanism
it must be true that all individuals with characteristics in X prefer a large provision
level Q(p′) over a small provision level Q(p). All other individuals prefer the small
provision level over the large provision level.
Lemma 4 Let wH > wL. Then EW∗∗
X < EW∗ for all X ∈ X.
Lemmas 4 and 3 imply that statement i) of Proposition 4 is true. We omit a formal
proof of Lemma 4 and only sketch the main arguments. Suppose ﬁrst that wH is suf-














Figure 1. The order of provision levels if θLwH < θHwL.
where Q∗(0) and Q∗(1) are the minimal and the maximal element, respectively, of the
image of the modiﬁed Samuelson Rule, Q∗, and Qjk is the maximizer of U(Q,θj,wk)
for j,k ∈ {L,H}.
Consider a voting mechanism where all individuals with a high taste parameter vote
yes. Consequently, for any pair Q(p′) and Q(p) with p′ > p it must be true that
U(Q(p′),θH,wL) ≥ U(Q(p),θH,wL) .
This implies that there is at most one p such that Q(p) ∈ [QHL,Q∗(1)]. Suppose to the
contrary that there are Q(p) and Q(p′) with QHL < Q(p) < Q(p′). Since U(Q,θH,wL)
is a single-peaked function of Q, U(Q(p′),θH,wL) < U(Q(p),θH,wL). Hence, a con-
tradiction. By the same logic, there is at most one p such that Q(p) ∈ [Q∗(0),QLH].
Otherwise we would contradict U(Q(p),θL,wH) ≥ U(Q(p′),θL,wH).
Since the image of Q∗ contains the intervals [Q∗(0),QLH] and [QHL,Q∗(1)], this implies
that EW∗ cannot be approximated by a voting mechanism where all individuals with
a high taste parameter vote yes.
17The same is true for any alternative voting mechanism. Consider for instance, a vot-
ing mechanism where individuals with characteristics in {(θL,wH),(θH,wL),(θH,wH)}
vote yes. Under such a voting mechanism there can be at most one p such that






converges to EW∗ as wH converges to wL.
Lemmas 5 and 3 imply that statement ii) of Proposition 4 is true. Again, we only
sketch the proof. It follows from the observation that QLH converges to QLL and QHL
converges to QHH as wH converges to wL. Hence, under a voting mechanism where all
individuals with a high taste parameter vote yes the distorted intervals [Q∗(0),QLH]
and [QHL,Q∗(1)] get smaller and smaller. In the limit, the modiﬁed Samuelson Rule
Q∗ is achievable.
4.4 The Optimal Democratic Mechanism
In the following we will study a simpliﬁed version of our model that makes it possible
to solve explicitly for the optimal democratic mechanism. We focus on the eﬀect of
skill heterogeneity on welfare. In particular, we will show that welfare decreases as the
gap wH − wL between a high-skilled and a low-skilled individual increases.
Assumption 2 Let θL = 1, θH = 2. Suppose that K(Q) = 1
2Q2. Let wL = 1 − x and
wH = 1 + x. For any x, let λ = 1.
The assumptions θL = 1 and θH = 2 are normalizations. Assuming a quadratic cost
function is a simpliﬁcation that implies that the optimal provision level from the per-
spective of an individual with characteristics (θ,w) equals θw and that this individual
prefers a provision level Q′ over Q′′ if and only if | θw − Q′ | ≤ | θw − Q′′ |.
x is our measure of skill heterogeneity. We let x vary between 0 and 1 and assume
that the shadow cost of public funds λ remains constant. Hence, as we vary x, we
are also adjusting the share of high-skilled individuals in the population, η, so that λ
remains unaﬀected. Holding λ ﬁxed at 1 implies that the modiﬁed Samuelson Rule Q∗
is given by Q∗(p) = 1 + p. This assumption is important for the interpretation of our
comparative statics result. For any x, the benchmark is given by Q∗.
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 2 the following statements are true.
i) For 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.236, X∗ = {(θH,wL),(θH,wH)}, and EW∗∗
X∗ is a decreasing func-
tion of x. The optimal provision rule has four bunching regions and is increasing
18for medium levels of p, i.e., there exist numbers Qss, Qs, Ql and Qll such that
Q(p) =

      
      
Qss for 0 ≤ p ≤ ˆ p ,
Qs for ˆ p < p < ˆ p′ ,
Q∗(p) for ˆ p′ ≤ p ≤ ˜ p′ ,
Ql for ˜ p′ < p < ˜ p ,
Qll for ˜ p ≤ p ≤ 1 ,
where U(Qss,θL,wH) = U(Qs,θL,wH), and U(Ql,θH,wL) = U(Qll,θH,wL).
ii) For 0.236 ≤ x ≤ 0.244, X∗ = {(θH,wL),(θH,wH)}, and EW∗∗
X∗ is a decreasing
function of x. The optimal provision rule has three bunching regions, i.e. there





Qs for 0 ≤ p ≤ ˆ p ,
Qm for ˆ p < p < ˜ p ,
Ql for ˜ p ≤ p ≤ 1 ,
where U(Qs,θL,wH) = U(Qm,θL,wH) and U(Qm,θH,wL) = U(Ql,θH,wL).
iii) For 0.244 ≤ x ≤ 0.373, X∗ = {(θH,wH)}, and EW∗∗
X∗ is an increasing function
of x for x < 1
3 and a decreasing function for x > 1
3. The optimal provision rule
has two bunching regions and is increasing for high levels of p, i.e., there exist





Qs for 0 ≤ p ≤ ˆ p ,
Ql for ˆ p < p < ˆ p′ ,
Q∗(p) for ˆ p′ ≤ p ≤ 1 .
If θLwH ≤ θHwL, then U(Qs,θH,wL) = U(Ql,θH,wL), and if θLwH > θHwL,
then U(Qs,θL,wH) = U(Ql,θL,wH).
iv) For 0.373 ≤ x ≤ 1, X∗ = {(θH,wH)} and the optimal provision rule has two
bunching intervals with provision levels Qs and Ql. For 0.373 ≤ x ≤ 1
2, the con-
straint U(Qs,θL,wH) ≥ U(Ql,θL,wH) is not binding so that EW∗∗
X∗ is constant.
For x ≥ 1
2, the constraint U(Qs,θL,wH) = U(Ql,θL,wH) is binding implying
that EW∗∗
X∗ is a decreasing function of x. For x → 1, EW∗∗
X∗ converges to the
maximal level of welfare that can be achieved by choosing the same provision
level for every p.
The proof of Proposition 5 is based on a taxonomy of possible solutions to the problem
of ﬁnding an optimal democratic mechanism that we develop in the Appendix.14
If wH is close to wL, then the optimal provision rule for the public good has four
14To develop this taxonomy Assumption 2 is not needed. We used this Assumption only to determine
numerically which of the candidate solutions yields the highest level of welfare.
19bunching regions and an increasing region for medium levels of p. It is necessary to
deviate from Q∗ for low values of p, because otherwise high-skilled individuals with a
low taste parameter vote yes, and for high values of p, because otherwise low-skilled
individuals with a high taste parameter vote no. Formally, for p small, the constraint
U(Q(p−ǫ),θL,wH) ≥ U(Q(p),θL,wH) is binding. Hence, there is only a choice between
Qss and Qs, where Qs is the provision level exceeding QLH with the property that an
individual with type (θL,wH) is indiﬀerent between Qss and Qs. For high values of p,
the constraint U(Q(p − ǫ),θH,wL) ≤ U(Q(p),θH,wL) is binding. This implies that for













Figure 2. The ﬁgure depicts a provision rule with four bunching regions. Over an intermediate
range the provision rule is strictly increasing and coincides with the modiﬁed Samuelson Rule,
Q∗. The graph assumes a quadratic cost function so that Q∗ is linear in p.
Under an optimal provision rule, Qs and Ql get closer to each other as x increases
and θLwH approaches θHwL . A provision rule with three bunching regions arises as
the limit case in which the range over which the provision rule is continuously increas-









Figure 3. The ﬁgure depicts a provision rule with three bunching regions.
As x increases the provision levels Qs, Qm and Ql converge to each other. In the
limit there would be a provision rule with only one bunching region, i.e., a provision
rule that does not use any information on the state p of the economy. As a conse-
quence, a voting mechanism where all individuals with a high taste parameter vote
yes, X = {(θH,wl),(θH,wH)}, is not optimal for x suﬃciently large. It becomes supe-
20rior to use a voting mechanism where only individuals with a high taste parameter and
a high skill level are in favor of more public spending, X = {(θH,wH)}. To illustrate













Figure 4. The order of provision levels if θLwH is close to θHwL.
Compared to a voting mechanism with X = {(θH,wL),(θH,wH)}, a mechanism with
X = {(θH,wH)} has the weakness that there can be only one provision level smaller
than QHL, but the strength that the whole interval [QHL,Q∗(1)] can be used. This
advantage is the dominating eﬀect if QHL is small and the interval [QHL,Q∗(1)] is
large. In this case the optimal provision rule has the shape that is illustrated by Figure
5. Moreover, this advantage becomes stronger and stronger the larger x and hence the
smaller QHL. This explains that EW∗∗
X∗ is an increasing function of x for 0.244 ≤ x ≤ 1
3.
If x > 1
3, then θLwH > θHwL, and a voting mechanism with X = {(θH,wL),(θH,wH)}
is no longer admissible. In this case, an optimal voting mechanism with X = {(θH,wH)}












Figure 5. The ﬁgure depicts a provision rule with two bunching regions. For large p the
provision rule is strictly increasing and coincides with the modiﬁed Samuelson Rule, Q∗.
For x > 1
3, the optimal level of Ql increases in x. For x suﬃciently large, the range
over which the optimal provision coincides with Q∗ shrinks to a singleton. Hence for x
large, the optimal provision has two bunching intervals. In the limit case x → 1, the
optimal provision rule with two bunching intervals yields the same level of welfare as
the optimal uninformed provision rule, i.e., the optimal provision rule that requires to
choose the same provision level for all p.






EW ∗ − EW u
that is realized under an optimal democratic mechanism. EWu denotes the the maxi-
mal level of welfare that can be achieved by choosing the same provision level for every
21p.15 Hence, EW∗ − EWu is the utility gain from an eﬃcient decision on public good
provision and FS is the fraction of this utility gain that is realized under an optimal
democratic mechanism.








Figure 6. The fraction of the surplus realized by an optimal democratic mechanism as a func-
tion of the skill gap x.
The graph shows that FS converges to 1 as x converges to 0 and converges to 0
as x converges to 1. Put diﬀerently, if there is no heterogeneity in skills then eﬃ-
ciency is possible under a democratic mechanism. If skill heterogeneity is large, then a
democratic mechanism cannot use any information on the distribution of public goods
preferences.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied democratic mechanisms that are deﬁned by the property that
a population of tax payers is voting over public goods. It has been shown that these
mechanisms perform worse than mechanisms that make use of the possibility to separate
the individuals who decide on public good provision from the population of tax payers.
By contrast, if all individuals have to pay taxes, then there is an interaction between
the tax system and the problem of preference elicitation which implies that inequality
is problematic for public good provision. In this sense, our paper provides a critique of
democratic mechanisms.
However, if viewed from a diﬀerent angle, democratic mechanisms are not too bad. Our
analysis shows that they are strictly better than “myopic” mechanisms that would be
based on the following reasoning: Suppose we take it as given that individuals pay taxes
and that the taxes they pay depend on a lot of characteristics such as their abilities.
However, the problem at hand is to elicit public goods preferences. So we design a
mechanism such that individuals communicate their preferences truthfully and remain
ignorant about all the other characteristics. We just make sure that truth-telling is a
best response whatever these characteristics are.
15Under Assumption 2, Q(p) =
3
2, for all p.
22In our model we would formalize this as a mechanism where individuals announce a
taste parameter and we would require that truth-telling is optimal for every possible
skill level. Such a myopic mechanism is equivalent to a voting mechanism where all
individuals with high taste parameter are in favor of increased public spending. As
our analysis has shown it is in general possible to improve on such a mechanism. For
instance, the optimum can be such that only individuals with a high taste parameter
and a high skill level vote for more public goods.
We think that, for many applications of mechanism design, a myopic interpretation not
too implausible. The typical textbook treatment is a partial equilibrium analysis where
individuals have utility functions that are linear in money. This approach focusses on
one particular aspect of heterogeneity and abstracts from all other characteristics that
individuals have. If we take this myopic approach as a benchmark, then democratic
mechanisms appear quite attractive.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.
Step 1. We ﬁrst derive the posterior beliefs of the mechanism designer. Given the
assumption that individual taste parameters and skill levels are stochastically indepen-
dent, it is without loss of generality to assume that the mechanism designer’s posterior
beliefs are a function of the number ν of agents with a high taste parameter in a sample
of size N.
The mechanism designer’s prior beliefs are given by the density function φ. Under
Assumption 1, φ(p) = 1, for all p ∈ [0,1]. From an ex ante perspective, ν is a random
variable, with16
pr(ν = m) =
1  
0







pm(1 − p)N−mdp =
1
N + 1 .
(7)
This is intuitive, with p uniformly distributed, all possible realizations of ν are equally
likely. Now suppose that ν = m and consider the conditional density φ thereby induced
over p. By Bayes’ rule
φ(p | ν = m) =
pr(ν = m | p)φ(p)




pm(1 − p)N−m .









23Step 2. A provision level Q induces the following level of expected welfare,
1  
0
[(pθH + (1 − p)θL)Q − λK(Q)]φ(p | ν = m)dp
= (N + 1)
 N
m
   1  
0





N + 2θH +
N − m + 1
N + 2 θL
 
Q − λK(Q) .
Proof of Proposition 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that preferences
of individuals are given in the reduced form θiQ − 1
wiK(Q) that has been derived in
Lemma 1.
Step 1. Let θLwH ≤ θHwL. Incentive compatibility of an eﬃcient provision rule holds
























For N suﬃciently large, there exists m such that Q∗
N(m + 1) < QLH, where QLH
is the preferred quantity of an individual with θi = θL and wi = wH, i.e. QLH is
the maximizer of θLQ −
K(Q)
w . To see this, note that there is p′ ∈ (0,1) such that
Q∗(p′) = QLH, i.e. there is a state p′ such that the modiﬁed Samuelson Rule requires to
provide the preferred quantity of individuals with θi = θL and wi = wH. Consequently,
m+2
N+2 close to zero implies that Q∗

















Hence, a contradiction to incentive compatibility. Analogously, one can show that for
m
N+2 close to 1 the incentive compatibility constraint for individuals with θi = θH and
wi = wL is violated.
Step 2. Let θLwH > θHwL. If the characteristics of i are given by (θi,wi) = (θL,wH),




N(m + 1) − K(Q∗
N(m + 1)) .




N(m + 1) − K(Q∗
N(m + 1)) .














24or, equivalently, θLwH ≥ θHwL. Hence, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let QN be an eﬃcient provision rule for a sample of size






















N + 2θH +
N − m + 1














This term is known as the Riemann sum17 for the function (pθH + (1 − p)θL)Q∗(p) −
λK(Q∗(p)) and thus converges to EW∗ for growing N.
Proof of Proposition 3.
“⇐=”: Suppose provision rule QN satisﬁes i), ii) and iii). Deﬁne a voting mechanism
QV
N such that for every z ∈ {0,...,N}, QN(z) = QV
N(z). Consider the strategy σ with
σ(θ,w) = yes, whenever (θ,w) ∈ X, and σ(θ,w) = no, otherwise.
We ﬁrst show that σ is an equilibrium in dominant strategies for the game induced
by QV
N. Suppose otherwise, then there is my and (θ,w) such that σ(θ,w) = no and
U(QV
N(my),θ,w) < U(QV
N(my − 1),θ,w) or σ(θ,w) = yes and U(QV
N(my),θ,w) <
U(QV
N(my+1),θ,w). But this implies that there is mX and (θ,w) such that (θ,w) ∈ −X
and U(QN(mX),θ,w) < U(QN(mX − 1),θ,w) or (θ,w) ∈ X and U(QN(mX),θ,w) <
U(QN(mX + 1),θ,w). Hence, a contradiction to the assumption that iii) holds.
It remains to show that QN((θi,wi)i∈SN) = QV
N(mσ
y((θi,wi)i∈SN)), for every (θi,wi)i∈SN.
This follows from the fact that QN can be viewed a function of mX and that for every
mX, mX = mσ
y((θi,wi)i∈SN).
“=⇒”: Suppose provision rule QN is implementable by a voting mechanism QV
N with
dominant strategy σ.
We ﬁrst show that σ(θ,w) = no and σ(θ′,w′) = yes implies that θw ≤ θ′w′, for any





N(my − 1) − K(QV
N(my − 1)) ,
and
θwQV
N(my − 1) − K(QV
N(my − 1)) ≥ θwQV
N(my) − K(QV
N(my)) .
Adding these constraints implies that
(θ′w′ − θw)(QV
N(my) − QV
N(my − 1)) ≥ 0
or, since QV
N is a non-decreasing function, θ′w′ ≥ θw. Hence a contradiction.
Deﬁne the set X′ = {(θ,w) ∈ Θ × W | σ(θ,w) = yes}. We show that QN satisﬁes i)
17See e.g. Heuser (1998, Ch.10).
25and ii) for X′.
Consider two samples SN and S′
N such that #{i ∈ SN | (θi,wi) ∈ X′} = #{i ∈ S′
N |





plements QN, this also implies that QN((θi,wi)i∈SN) = QN((θi,wi)i∈S′
N).
We ﬁnally show that iii) holds. Suppose otherwise, then there exists mX and (θ,w)
such that (θ,w) ∈ −X′ and U(QN(mX),θ,w) < U(QN(mX − 1),θ,w) or (θ,w) ∈ X′
and U(QN(mX),θ,w) < U(QN(mX + 1),θ,w). Since QV
N implements QN, it must be
true that QN(z) = QV
N(z), for all z ∈ {0,...,N}. Hence, there is my and (θ,w) such
that σ(θ,w) = no and U(QV
N(my),θ,w) < U(QV
N(my − 1),θ,w) or σ(θ,w) = yes and
U(QV
N(my),θ,w) < U(QV
N(my + 1),θ,w). But this contradicts the assumption that σ
is a dominant strategy.
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof consists of two parts. In part A, we show that the
statement is true for the case of X = {(θH,wL),(θH,wH)}. In part B, we demonstrate
that the same arguments also apply to the case of X = {(θH,wH)} (and analogously
to X = {(θL,wH),(θH,wL),(θH,wH)}).
Part A. Consider X = {(θH,wL),(θH,wH)}.


















Step 2. We now show that EW∗∗
N,X ≤ EW∗∗
X for any N ∈ N. To establish this claim,









N + 1 ≤ p <
mX + 1




The welfare level induced by ˜ Q∗∗
N,X is denoted   EW
∗∗
N,X. By deﬁnition, ˜ Q∗∗
N,X is mono-
tonically increasing in p and meets the constraints (5) and (6) since Q∗∗
N,X meets (3)
and (4). Hence, by the optimality of Q∗∗
X among the provision rules satisfying (5) and
(6),   EW
∗∗
N,X ≤ EW∗∗
X . It thus suﬃces to show that EW∗∗
N,X ≤   EW
∗∗
N,X.
In order to compute   EW
∗∗
N,X, we ﬁrst collect a number of observations which are easily
veriﬁed by the reader.
1. For all p
¯
, ¯ p ∈ [0,1] we have
  ¯ p
p
¯
v(p)dp = (¯ p − p
¯
)v








N + 1 =
m + 1




(N + 1)(N + 2).
3. For all x,y ∈ [0,1] with x + y ∈ [0,1] we have v(x + y) = v(x) + θH−θL
λ y.







¯ v(p) ˜ Q∗∗


























N,X(N − mX) − Q∗∗
N,X(mX))






N,X(N − mX) − Q∗∗
N,X(mX))
if N is odd. However, as Q∗∗
N,X is increasing, those sums are non-negative.
Step 3. We now establish that EW∗∗
N,X converges to EW∗∗
X as N → ∞. To this end,
for any N ∈ N, consider the restriction Q∗∗
X|N of Q∗∗
X to the domain {0,1,...,N}.








X|N is monotonically increasing in mX for any N ∈ N and meets the constraints
(3) and (4) as Q∗∗
X satisﬁes (5) and (6). Denote by EW∗∗
X|N the expected welfare level
induced by Q∗∗
X|N. Noting that Q∗∗
N,X is optimal among the provision rules satisfying
(3) and (4) and using step 2, we then have EW∗∗
X|N ≤ EW∗∗
N,X ≤ EW∗∗
X for any N ∈ N.























































   
+
θH − θL










The ﬁrst term in this sum is known as the Riemann sum for v(p)Q∗∗
X(p) − K(Q∗∗
X(p)
and thus converges to EW∗∗
X for growing N.18 The absolute value of the second term
in the sum is bounded from above by the expression θH−θL
N+2 Q∗∗
X(1), which vanishes as
N → ∞.
Part B. Consider X = {(θH,wH)}.19 Let νX := #{i ∈ SN | (θi,wi) = (θH,wH)}
and ν := #{i ∈ SN | θi = θH}. We show that for large N, the objective function
for a voting mechanism with X = {(θH,wH)} has the same mathematical structure
as a voting mechanism with X = {(θH,wL),(θH,wH)}. This implies that the same
arguments can be used to establish convergence.
18See, e.g., Heuser (1998, Ch.10).
19An analogous argument can be made for X = {(θL,wH),(θH,wL),(θH,wH)}.
27Let QN,X : mX  → QN,X(mX) be an admissible provision rule for a voting mechanism
with X = {(θH,wH)}. Using similar computations as in the proof of Lemma 2, we


































ηN−k(1 − η)k. The sum in the second line can
without loss of generality be assumed to be bounded because it will never be optimal
to choose an inﬁnitely large provision level of the public good; hence the term in the
second line vanishes as N → ∞.
The random variable 1
η
mX+1
N+2 is a consistent estimator for the unknown value of p ∈
[0,1].20 The random variable
νX′
N for X′ = {(θH,wL),(θH,wH)} is also a consistent
estimator of p. Moreover, the probability distributions of both random variables con-
verge to a uniform density as N → ∞.21 As a consequence, for large N, choosing





















such that (θ,w) ∈ {(θH,wH)} implies U(QN,X(mX),θ,w) ≥ U(QN,X(mX − 1),θ,w)
and that (θ,w) ∈ −{(θH,wH)} implies U(QN,X(mX,θ,w) ≥ U(QN,X(mX + 1),θ,w),













subject to the constraint that (θ,w) ∈ {(θH,wH)} implies U(QN,X′(mX′),θ,w) ≥
U(QN,X′(mX′ −1),θ,w) and that (θ,w) ∈ −{(θH,wH)} implies U(QN,X′(mX′,θ,w) ≥
U(QN,X′(mX′ + 1),θ,w).
20To see this note that – given any sample realization where mX individuals have characteristics in
X – the maximum likelihood estimator ˆ pML of p satisﬁes
ˆ pML = argmaxs∈[0,1](ηs)
mX(1 − ηs)
N−mX .









N+2 is also consistent.















N ≤ y)dp ,























N converges pointwise to a continuous random variable that is uniformly dis-
tributed over the interval [0,1].
28Given the latter optimization problem we can apply the arguments from part A again
to establish convergence.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is based on a taxonomy of candidate solutions
that we provide in Lemmas 6 - 8 below. To obtain the complete characterization that is
given in Proposition 5, we used numerical methods to single out the candidate solution
that yields the highest level of welfare.
Lemma 6 Consider voting mechanisms where the set of individuals who vote yes is
given by X = {(θH,wL),(θH,wH)}. An optimal provision rule belongs to one of the
following categories:
i) Provision rules that are constant over four “bunching regions” and that are in-
creasing for medium levels of p. For such a provision rule there exist numbers
Qss, Qs, Ql and Qll such that
Q(p) =

      
      
Qss for 0 ≤ p ≤ ˆ p ,
Qs for ˆ p < p < ˆ p′ ,
Q∗(p) for ˆ p′ ≤ p ≤ ˜ p′ ,
Ql for ˜ p′ < p < ˜ p ,
Qll for ˜ p ≤ p ≤ 1 ,
where U(Qss,θL,wH) = U(Qs,θL,wH), U(Ql,θH,wL) = U(Qll,θH,wL) and the
critical indices are implicitly deﬁned by the following equations:
¯ v(ˆ p) = θLwH , Q∗(ˆ p′) = Qs , Q∗(˜ p′) = Ql , ¯ v(˜ p) = θHwL .
ii) Provision rules that are constant over three “bunching regions”. For such a pro-





Qs for 0 ≤ p ≤ ˆ p ,
Qm for ˆ p < p < ˜ p ,
Ql for ˜ p ≤ p ≤ 1 ,
where U(Qs,θL,wH) = U(Qm,θL,wH), U(Qm,θH,wL) = U(Ql,θH,wL) and the
critical indices ˆ p and ˜ p are deﬁned implicitly by the equations
¯ v(ˆ p) = θLwH and ¯ v(˜ p) = θHwL .
iii) that are constant over two “bunching regions”. For such a provision rule there
exist numbers Qs and Ql such that
Q(p) =
 
Qs for 0 ≤ p ≤ ˆ p ,
Ql for ˆ p < p ≤ 1 ,
29where the critical index ˆ p is deﬁned implicitly by the equation
¯ v(ˆ p)Qs − K(Qs) = ¯ v(ˆ p)Ql − K(Ql) .
Proof Claim 1. Denote by VQ the image of a provision rule Q : p  → Q(p), i.e. x ∈
VQ if and only if there exists p ∈ [0,1] with Q(p) = x. Suppose Q solves the
problem of maximizing EW subject to the following informative voting (IV ) con-
straints: for every pair p and p′ with p′ > p, (θ,w) ∈ {(θH,wL),(θH,wH)} implies
that U(Q(p′),θ,w) ≥ U(Q(p),θ,w), and (θ,w) ∈ {(θL,wL),(θL,wH)} implies that
U(Q(p),θ,w) ≥ U(Q(p′),θ,w). Then there exists at most one element x ∈ VQ with
x < QLH and at most one element z ∈ VQ with z > QHL.
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exist x,y ∈ VQ with x < y <
QLH. This implies that there exist p and p′ > p, with Q(p) < Q(p′) < QLH. Since
preferences are single-peaked,
θLwHQ(p) − K(Q(p)) < θLwHQ(p′) − K(Q(p′)) ,
a contradiction to the IV constraints. Analogously one shows that the image of an
admissible provision rule contains at most one element z with z > QHL.
Claim 2. A provision rule Q for which there exists y ∈ VQ with y ∈ [QLH,QHL] is a
candidate for a solution only if there exist x,z ∈ VQ with x < QLH and QHL < z.
Proof of Claim 2. We ﬁrst argue that a provision rule Q for which there exist neither
x ∈ VQ with x < QLH nor z ∈ VQ with z > QHL cannot be optimal. To be optimal,
such a hypothetical provision rule would have to be the degenerate case of a provision
rule with four pooling levels, which results as the limit outcome as Qss converges to
QLH and Ql converges to QHL. Under a provision rule characterized by four pooling
levels, expected welfare EW satisﬁes the following equation:
EW




















˜ p′  
ˆ p′
 
¯ v(p)Q∗(p) − K(Q∗(p))
 




















where Qs and ˆ p′ are implicit functions of Qss. Similarly, Ql and ˜ p′ are implicit functions
of Qll. Taking these functional relationships into account, one may compute the partial








Thus, Qss = QLH and Qll = QHL cannot be optimal.
We now argue in a similar manner that it cannot be optimal to choose a provision
30rule with y,z ∈ VQ satisfying QLH < y < QHL < z, but without x ∈ VQ satisfying
x < QLH:
Deﬁne ˜ z < QHL by the equation θHwL z − K(z) = θHwL˜ z − K(˜ z). Note that for
such a provision rule to be a optimal under it has to be true that y ≤ ˜ z and that
VQ = [QLH, ˜ z] ∪ {z} by Claim 1. Again, this is a degenerate case of a provision rule
with four pooling levels, namely the one that results as Qss converges to QLH and





The analogous argument allows us to rule out a provision rule with x,y ∈ VQ and
x < QLH < y < QHL but without z ∈ VQ satisfying z > QHL.
These arguments imply that an optimal provision rule has to be one with two, three or
four bunching regions.
Lemma 7 Consider voting mechanisms where the set of individuals who vote yes is
given by X = {(θH,wH)}. An optimal provision rule belongs to one of the following
categories:
i) Provision rules that are constant over two bunching regions and that are increasing






Qs for 0 ≤ p ≤ ˆ p ,
Ql for ˆ p < p < ˆ p′ ,
Q∗(p) for ˆ p′ ≤ p ≤ 1 .
If θLwH ≤ θHwL, then U(Qs,θH,wL) = U(Ql,θH,wL) and the critical indices are
deﬁned by ¯ v(ˆ p) = θHwL and Q∗(ˆ p′) = Ql. If θLwH > θHwL, then U(Qs,θL,wH) =
U(Ql,θL,wH) and the critical indices are deﬁned by ¯ v(ˆ p) = θLwH and Q∗(ˆ p′) =
Ql.
ii) Provision rules with two bunching regions.
Proof The proof uses similar arguments as the proof of Lemma 6. Hence, the ar-
guments are only sketched. Suppose Q solves the problem of maximizing EW sub-
ject to the following informative voting (IV ) constraints: for every pair p and p′
with p′ > p, (θ,w) ∈ {(θH,wH)} implies that U(Q(p′),θ,w) ≥ U(Q(p),θ,w), and
(θ,w) ∈ {(θH,wL),(θL,wL),(θL,wH)} implies that U(Q(p),θ,w) ≥ U(Q(p′),θ,w).
Claim. If θLwH < θHwL, then there is exactly one element x ∈ VQ with x < QLH.
If θHwL ≤ θLwH < θHwL, then there is exactly is at most one element x ∈ VQ with
x < QHL.
Proof. Because preferences are single-peaked there can be at most one x ∈ VQ with
x < QLH (x < QHL) if θLwH < θHwL (θHwL ≤ θLwH). It follows from the same
31argument as in Claim 3 in the proof of Lemma 6 that it cannot be optimal to have no
x ∈ VQ with x < QLH (x < QHL) if θLwH < θHwL (θHwL ≤ θLwH).
This implies that an optimal provision rule under IV constraints, which is not con-
stant, is constant over two bunching regions. Depending on the parameters it may be
optimal to choose the larger bunching point Ql such that Ql < Q∗(1). In this case
there is a range of large values of p, where the optimal provision rule coincides with
the Samuelson Rule Q∗. These are the levels of p for which Q∗(p) ≥ Ql.
The analysis of a voting mechanism where only individuals with characteristics given by
(θL,wL) vote no is the mirror image of the case where only individuals with (θH,wH)
vote yes. The proof uses the same arguments as the proof of Lemma 7 and is omitted.
Lemma 8 Consider voting mechanisms where the set of individuals who vote yes is
given by X = {(θH,wL),(θL,wH),(θH,wH)}. An optimal provision rule belongs to one
of the following categories:
i) Provision rules that are constant over two bunching regions and that are increasing
interval for small levels of p. For such a provision rule there exist numbers Qs





Q∗(p) for 0 ≤ p ≤ ˆ p ,
Qs for ˆ p < p < ˆ p′ ,
Ql for ˆ p′ ≤ p ≤ 1 .
If θLwH ≤ θHwL, then U(Qs,θL,wH) = U(Ql,θL,wH) and the critical indices are
deﬁned by ¯ v(ˆ p′) = θLwH and Q∗(ˆ p) = Qs. If θLwH > θHwL, then U(Qs,θH,wL) =
U(Ql,θH,wL) and the critical indices are deﬁned by ¯ v(ˆ p′) = θHwL and Q∗(ˆ p) =
Ql.
ii) Provision rules with two bunching intervals.
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